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Abstract
We develop a model for pricing expropriation risk in natural resource projects, in
particular an oil field. The government is viewed as holding an American-style option
to expropriate the oil field, but facing the following three possible expropriation
costs: A state-run company may produce oil less cost-efficiently than a private firm,
the government may have to pay a compensation to the firm, and an expropriation
may trigger lower investor confidence negatively affecting the overall economy. The
dynamics of key variables – the spot price, futures prices and volatility – is described
by a model proposed and estimated in Trolle and Schwartz (2007). For reasonable
parameter values and under market conditions not too different from what has been
seen in recent years, the value of the expropriation option can be substantial.
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1 Introduction
There are many dimensions to the study of expropriation risk in natural resources including
political, environmental, sociological and economic issues. In this paper we abstract form most
of these aspects and concentrate on some of the important economic tradeoffs that arise from
the government having an option to expropriate the resource.
We show how to use the real options approach to value a natural resource project, in
particular an oil field, exposed to expropriation risk.1 We view the government as holding an
option to expropriate the oil field.2 The government faces a tradeoff. By expropriating, it
will receive all future profits from the oil field rather than just a fraction of profits through
taxes. However, there are also costs associated with expropriating, and we consider three such
costs. Firstly, a state-run company may produce oil less cost-efficiently than a private firm.
Secondly, the government may have to pay a compensation to the firm. Thirdly and perhaps
most importantly, there may be “reputational” costs in the sense that investors will perceive
the government as being more likely to renege on other contracts as well, and will therefore
be more reluctant to make new investments in the country, particularly in capital intensive
natural resource projects, negatively affecting the overall economy.
The dynamics of the crude-oil spot price, futures prices and volatility that we use for the
analysis is described by a model proposed in Trolle and Schwartz (2007). This model has several
attractive features. Futures prices are driven by two factors, with one factor affecting the spot
price of the commodity and another factor affecting the slope of the futures curve though the
cost of carry. Futures (and spot) price volatility is stochastic and is driven by a third factor
which implies that options are driven by three factors and that the model features “unspanned
stochastic volatility” (that is, volatility risk cannot be completely hedged by trading in futures
contracts) consistent with the data. The model has quasi-analytical prices of European-style
options on futures contracts enabling fast calibration to liquid plain-vanilla exchange-traded
derivatives. Finally, the dynamics of the futures curve can be described in terms of four state
variables (three stochastic and one deterministic) jointly constituting an affine state vector
which makes the model ideally suited for pricing complex commodity derivatives, including
1For a comprehensive exposition of the real options approach to valuation, see Dixit and Pindyck (1994).
2Throughout the paper, we consider the risk of the state taking over the entire oil field. The framework could
be modified to consider the risk of a partial expropriation through a forced renegotiation of existing contracts
involving, for instance, an increase in taxes or the state taking a certain stake in the oil field.
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real options, such as the expropriation option, by simulation.3
In Trolle and Schwartz (2007), the model was estimated and tested on NYMEX4 crude-oil
derivatives using an extensive panel data set of 45,517 futures prices and 233,104 option prices
from January 2, 1990 until May 18, 2006, ensuring that the model provides a realistic descrip-
tion of the dynamics of the crude-oil market. This allows us to make not only qualitative, but
also quantitative, predictions about the value of the expropriation option in various scenarios.
The expropriation option is an American-style option, since it can be exercised at any time
during the life of the project. To value the option by simulation we use the Least Squares
Monte Carlo (LSM) approach developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001). At every point in
time, the government must compare the value of immediate exercise (expropriation) with the
conditional expected value (under the risk neutral measure) from continuation. The conditional
expected value of continuation, for each simulated path at each point in time, can be obtained
from the fitted value of the linear regression of the discounted value (at the risk free rate) of
the cash flows obtained from the simulation following the optimal exercise policy in the future,
on a set of basis functions of the state variables. It is a recursive procedure starting from
the maturity of the option and the outcome is the optimal exercise time for each path in the
simulation. Knowing the optimal exercise time for each path, the expropriation option can
then be easily valued. We can also estimate the value of the oil field to the government and
to the firm both in the presence and absence of expropriation risk.
We find that, for a given contractual arrangement, the value of the expropriation option
increases with the spot price, the slope of the futures curve and futures (and spot) price
volatility. For a given set of state variables the value of the expropriation option decreases
with the tax rate and with the various expropriation costs. Under realistic conditions, the
value of the expropriation option is substantial and expropriation risk has a significant impact
on the value of the oil field to the government and to the firm. We also find that if the
government switches from corporate income taxes to royalty taxes in such a way that the
value of the oil field to the government in the absence of expropriation risk is unchanged, the
3Alternatively, we could use one of the more parsimonious models in Schwartz (1997) to describe the dynamics
of crude-oil spot and futures prices. However, none of these models incorporate stochastic volatility, making
them inferior to the Trolle and Schwartz (2007) model in terms of pricing options. Furthermore, since we
price the expropriation option by simulation, there are only minor computational advantages of using a more
parsimonious model.
4New York Mercantile Exchange.
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value of the expropriation option increases. Finally, from the firm’s point of view there is an
“optimal” corporate income tax rate, that may be quite high in order to reduce the incentive
for the government to expropriate.
With rational expectations, the firm will anticipate the situations under which the govern-
ment expropriates. This implies that the increase in the oil field’s value to the government
due to expropriation risk is smaller than the decrease in the field’s value to the firm, since oil
may be extracted at a higher cost after the government expropriates and since there may be
“reputational” costs to the government. In this sense, there is a “deadweight loss” associated
with the possibility of expropriation. The reduction in the field’s value to the firm due to ex-
propriation risk is exactly matched by a reduction in the amount that the firm will be willing
to bid during the process when the government auctions off the lease for the field. Hence,
the total value that the government can extract from the field is smaller in the presence of
expropriation risk than in the absence of expropriation risk. It would therefore be optimal for
the government to commit itself to not expropriate the field, although such a commitment is
not believable in countries without a credible legal framework to enforce contracts.
In our analysis, we will abstract from the various operational options that are typically
imbedded in natural resource projects. These include options to adjust production as prices
increase or decrease and the option to abandon the project if prices become too low. Due
to the flexibility of the LSM approach, such options could be incorporated into the analysis.
However, in the interest of parsimony, and because a wide variety of operational options have
already been analyzed in the literature (see e.g. Brennan and Schwartz (1985) for an early
paper), we do not include them here.
A couple of other papers also view expropriation risk through the lens of option pricing.
These include Mahajan (1990) and Clark (2003) who both value an American-style expropria-
tion option. However, in these papers the underlying models of uncertainty are highly stylized
in order to obtain closed-form solutions for the expropriation option.5
5Our paper is also related to Rigobon’s paper in this volume. In his model, the firm chooses the optimal
production plan which, given the tax rates and the risk of expropriation, maximizes profits, while the government
optimally chooses the royalty and income tax rates subject to certain restrictions. However, the commodity price
process is highly simplified (a random walk) and he uses a simplified exercise strategy of the expropriation option
(the government expropriates if profits rise above a fixed threshold). In contrast, in our model, the production
plan and tax rates are exogenous. Instead we provide a realistic model for the evolution of commodity prices
and compute the optimal exercise strategy of the expropriation option.
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The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 2 discusses the pricing of expropriation risk.
Section 3 analyzes a stylized illustrative example. Section 4 concludes. Appendix A briefly
describes the modelling of the crude-oil market. Appendix B describes the LSM procedure
used for pricing the expropriation option.
2 Pricing expropriation risk
We assume that the oil field has a life of T years. For the purpose of valuation we divide the
T years into N periods, each with a length of ∆t = T/N , and define tn = n∆t, n = 0, 1, ..., N .
We assume that oil produced during period n, i.e. from tn−1 to tn is sold at the end of the
period. The amount sold at time tn is denoted Y (tn).
Let S(ti) be the time-ti spot price of crude-oil and F (ti, tn) be the time-ti price of a
futures contract maturing at time tn. The dynamics of S(ti) and F (ti, tn) are given by the
model proposed and estimated in Trolle and Schwartz (2007). For completeness, this model is
summarized in Appendix A and estimates of its risk-neutral parameters are given in Table 1.
Let r be the (constant) interest rate, τinc the corporate income tax rate, τroy the royalty
tax rate and Cfirm and Cgov the cost of producing one barrel of oil for the private firm and
the state-run company, respectively. We assume that the private firm may produce oil more
cost-efficiently than the state-run company, i.e. Cfirm ≤ Cgov, and that the government may
pay a compensation to the firm,K1(ti), and incur “reputational” costs, K2(ti), if expropriating
the oil field at time ti.
Harrison and Kreps (1979), Harrison and Pliska (1981) and others have shown that absence
of arbitrage implies the existence of a probability distribution such that securities are priced
based on their discounted (at the risk free rate) expected cash flows, where the expectation
is taken under this risk-neutral probability measure (also called the “equivalent martingale
measure”). When futures contracts exist, futures prices are the expected spot prices at the
maturities of the futures contracts under this risk-neutral measure.
If the government expropriates the oil field at time ti it will lose future tax receipts from
the firm and may pay a compensation to the firm and incur “reputational” costs. This has a
present value of
Vcost(ti) =
N∑
n=i+1
e−r(tn−ti) [(F (ti, tn) (1− τroy)− Cfirm) τinc + F (ti, tn)τroy]Y (tn) +K1(ti) +K2(ti). (1)
Instead it will receive all future profits from the oil field, which may now have higher production
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costs, with a present value of
Vgain(ti) =
N∑
n=i+1
e−r(tn−ti) (F (ti, tn)− Cgov)Y (tn). (2)
Let Π(ti) denote the (undiscounted) payoff from exercising the expropriation option at time
ti. It is given by
Π(ti) = max (Vgain(ti)− Vcost(ti), 0) . (3)
The option is of the American type since it can be exercised at any time before the oil field has
been depleted. In particular, we assume that it can be exercised at time tn, n = 1, ..., N − 1.
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Let P (ti) denote the value of the option at time ti, given that it has not already been exercised.
At time tN−1 the option value is simply
P (tN−1) = Π(tN−1). (4)
At time ti, i = 1, ..., N − 2 the value is given by
P (ti) = max
n=i,...,N−1
EQti
[
e−r(tn−ti)Π(tn)
]
= max
(
Π(ti), E
Q
ti
[
e−r(ti+1−ti)P (ti+1)
])
. (5)
In other words, prior to tN−1 the option value is equal to the maximum of exercising the option
immediately and the (risk-neutral) expected discounted value of keeping the option alive. This
means that we can value the option by a backward iterative procedure starting with (4) to
obtain P (tN−1), then applying (5) recursively to obtain P (tN−2), P (tN−3) and so on until we
reach P (t1). Then P (t0) = e
−r(t1−t0)P (t1).
The main problem is how to compute the conditional expectation in (5). This is a non-
trivial matter with a high-dimensional state vector such as the one used in this paper. A
simple and powerful procedure for pricing American options was suggested by Longstaff and
Schwartz (2001). It is a simulation-based procedure called Least Squares Monte Carlo. We
describe the procedure in more detail in Appendix B. It yields an estimate of the option price
as well as an estimate of the optimal exercise strategy.
Suppose we simulate M paths.7 Let tZm denote the estimated time of expropriation along
path m (with Zm = N if no expropriation takes place) and Sm(tn) the spot price at time tn
6We exclude current time t0 from the set of exercise opportunities. We also exclude tN since at that time
the oil field has been depleted.
7Throughout the paper, we use 10.000 paths and antithetic variates in the simulations.
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along path m. Then, the value of the oil field to the firm in the presence of expropriation risk
is
V expfirm(t0) =
1
M
M∑
m=1
( Zm∑
n=1
e−r(tn−t0) (Sm(tn) (1− τroy)− Cfirm) (1− τinc)Y (tn)
+e−r(tZm−t0)K1(tZm)
)
, (6)
while the value of the oil field to the government is
V expgov (t0)=
1
M
M∑
m=1
( Zm∑
n=1
e−r(tn−t0) [(Sm(tn) (1− τroy)− Cfirm) τinc + Sm(tn)τroy]Y (tn)
−e−r(tZm−t0) (K1(tZm) +K2(tZm)) +
N∑
n=Zm+1
e−r(tn−t0) (Sm(tn)−Cgov)Y (tn)
)
. (7)
In the absence of expropriation risk, the value of the oil field to the firm and to the
government are given analytically. The value to the firm is
Vfirm(t0) =
N∑
n=1
e−r(tn−t0) (F (t0, tn) (1− τroy)− Cfirm) (1− τinc)Y (tn), (8)
while the value to the government is8
Vgov(t0) =
N∑
n=1
e−r(tn−t0) [(F (t0, tn) (1− τroy)− Cfirm) τinc + F (t0, tn)τroy]Y (tn). (9)
3 Illustrative example
3.1 The base-line parameters
We consider a medium-sized oil field with an annual production of 10 million barrels for ten
years. In the base-line case, we make the following assumptions: In case of expropriation, the
government incurs “reputational” costs of 1.0 billion USD and pays the firm a compensation of
50 million USD times the remaining life of the oil field measured in years.9 Furthermore, the
private firm has a production cost of 10 USD/bl, while the state-run company has a production
8Note that we may alternatively compute the value of the oil field to the government in the presence of
expropriation risk as the value in the absence of expropriation risk plus the value of the expropriation option,
i.e. V expgov (t0) = Vgov(t0) + P (t0).
9For instance, if the government expropriates the oil field after seven years the firm will receive a compen-
sation of 150 million USD.
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cost of 15 USD/bl, the corporate income tax rate is 60 percent and the royalty tax rate is zero.10
The sensitivity of the results to these assumptions will be examined later. Finally, we assume
an interest rate of 5 percent and that expropriation can take place monthly. In the notation
of Section 2 we have T = 10, N = 120, Y (ti) = ∆t × 10 million bls, K1(ti) = (T − ti) × 50
million USD, K2(ti) = 1000 million USD, Cfirm = 10 USD/bl, Cgov = 15 USD/bl, τinc = 0.60,
τroy = 0 and r = 0.05.
In the following, we will focus on four statistics: 1) The dollar value of the expropriation
option, i.e. P (t0). 2) The “deadweight loss” associated with the possibility of expropria-
tion, i.e. (Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0)) −
(
V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)
)
. The “deadweight loss” is due to
the “reputational” costs and the fact that oil is extracted at a higher cost after the govern-
ment expropriates. This implies that the increase in the oil field’s value to the government
because of expropriation risk is always smaller than the decrease in the oil field’s value to the
firm. 3) The percentage increase in the oil field’s value to the government when taking into
account the expropriation possibility, i.e. V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0) − 1. 4) The percentage decrease
in the oil field’s value to the firm when taking into account the expropriation possibility, i.e.
−
(
V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1
)
.
3.2 Results
3.2.1 Expropriation risk as a function of state variables
We first investigate how these key statistics depend on the state variables. Figure 1 shows
the state variables over the period January 2, 1990 to May 18, 2006 as estimated by Trolle
and Schwartz (2007). S(t) is the spot price, x(t) determines the slope of the futures curve
through the cost of carry, v(t) determines futures (and spot) price volatility and φ(t) is a locally
deterministic state variable that enables the dynamics of the futures curve to be described by
a Markov process.
We first vary S(t) and x(t), holding v(t) constant at its long-run mean of 2.79 over the
sample. Based on Figure 1, a realistic range for S(t) is 20 USD/bl to 80 USD/bl11 while a
realistic range for x(t) is -3 to 3. To give a sense of how S(t) and x(t) impacts the futures
10For simplicity, we assume that production, production costs and tax rates are constant throughout the life
of the oil field. However, these could easily be made time and state dependent. For instance, it is likely that
annual production decreases and the marginal production cost increases as the oil field gets depleted.
11However, after the end of our sample period, crude-oil trading on NYMEX reached 100 USD/bl.
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curve, Figure 2 shows the futures curve at four extreme combinations of S(t) and x(t): (20
USD/bl, -3), (20 USD/bl, 3), (80 USD/bl, -3) and (80 USD/bl, 3). Clearly, the futures curve
is strongly in backwardation when x(t) = −3, while the futures curve is strongly in contango
when x(t) = 3. Since the correlation between innovations to S(t) and x(t) is strongly negative
(the estimate of ρ12 is -0.88 in Table 1) it is most likely that x(t) decreases as S(t) increases.
That is, the futures curve is most likely to be in contango when the spot price is low and in
backwardation when the spot price is high.
Figure 3 shows how the key statistics depend on S(t) and x(t). Not surprisingly, the dollar
value of the expropriation option, the “deadweight loss”, and the increase (decrease) of the oil
field’s value to the government (firm) all rise with S(t) and x(t). When the spot price is low
there is little incentive to expropriate given the various expropriation costs. The incentive is
even smaller if the futures curve is in backwardation, since in that case spot prices are expected
(under the risk-neutral measure) to decrease in the future. In contrast, when the spot price
is high and the futures curve is in contango, the incentive to expropriate is higher since the
prospect of receiving all the profits rather than a fraction of the profits may dominate the
expropriation costs. For high spot prices and upward-sloping futures curves, the value of the
expropriation option and the “deadweight loss” are very large. Keep in mind, though, that a
scenario where the futures curve is strongly in contango at high spot prices is not very likely
given the historical dynamics.
To give a sense of expropriation risk under reasonable market conditions we analyze the
following three specific dates in the sample: October 11, 1990, December 21, 1998 and April
21, 2006 (in Figure 1 these dates are marked by vertical grey lines). The first date is the date
when the spot price reaches its maximum during the first Gulf War and also corresponds to the
date where x(t) attains its minimum during the sample period. The second date is the date
when the spot price reaches its minimum and x(t) reaches its maximum during the sample
period. These two dates clearly illustrates the inverse relationship that normally exist between
the spot price and the slope of the futures curve. The last date corresponds to the date when
the spot price reaches its maximum during the sample period. Note that the futures curve is
not strongly backwardated at this date reflecting the fact that the slope of the futures curve
also exhibits variation that is independent of the spot price. Table 2 shows the values of the
state variables and a number of statistics related to the possibility of expropriation on these
three dates. On the first two dates, the value of the expropriation option and the “deadweight
loss” are very small. On the third date, however, expropriation risk is high. The value of
8
the expropriation option is 159 million USD and the valuation of the oil field is significantly
affected.12 The value of the field to the firm (government) is 1978 (2966) million USD in
the absence of expropriation risk compared with 993 (3125) million USD in the presence of
expropriation risk. For the firm, this is a decrease in value of almost 50 percent. There is also
a very large “deadweight loss” of 825 million USD.
We next vary S(t) and v(t), holding x(t) constant at zero (corresponding to a slightly
upward-sloping futures curve). Figure 1 shows that v(t) reached almost 20 at the beginning of
“Operation Desert Storm” in 1991 – a time of extreme market stress. Therefore, we vary v(t)
between 0 and 20. Figure 4 shows how the key statistics depend S(t) and v(t). Consistent with
standard option pricing theory, the dollar value of the expropriation option, and therefore the
increase in the oil field’s value to the government, rise with volatility. However, the oil field’s
value to the firm and the “deadweight loss” are not necessarily increasing in volatility. In fact,
for high spot prices they are decreasing in volatility since the likelihood of expropriation may
decrease.
3.2.2 Expropriation risk as a function of tax rate and expropriation costs
We now investigate how, for a given set of state variables, the statistics depend on the tax rate
and the expropriation costs.13 Figure 5 shows how the key statistics depend on τinc and K2,
when we vary τinc between zero and 100 percent and K2 between zero and 2000 million USD.
The dollar value of the expropriation option and the increase (decrease) of the oil field’s value
to the government (firm) all decline with τinc and K2. When the tax rate is 100 percent, the
government never expropriates, since it receives all profits from the oil field. In contrast, for
low tax rates and low “reputational” costs, the government almost certainly expropriates. In
these instances, the value of the expropriation option may easily exceed one billion USD.
For a given K2, the “deadweight loss” decreases with τinc since the expropriation likelihood
decreases with τinc. However, for a given τinc, the “deadweight loss” as a function of K2 is
“humped-shaped”. The reason is that there are two opposing forces: although the expropri-
ation likelihood decreases with K2, the inefficiency is greater when expropriation occurs. For
low tax rates and high (although not extreme) “reputational” costs, the “deadweight loss”
may also exceed one billion USD.
12The risk-neutral likelihood that the field will get expropriated during its 10 year lifespan is 62 percent.
13In the rest of the paper, unless otherwise noticed, the state variables are given by S(t) = 50, x(t) = 0 and
v(t) = 2.79.
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Figure 6 shows how the key statistics depend on K2 and Cgov, when we vary K2 between
zero and 2000 million USD and Cgov between 10 USD/bl (i.e. equal to Cfirm) and 20 USD/bl.
Except for the “deadweight loss”, Figure 6 is qualitatively similar to Figure 5. However, the
“deadweight loss” now exhibits a “hump-shape” along both dimensions. When K2 = 0 and
Cgov = 10 USD/bl, the government almost certainly expropriates, but there is no inefficiency.
As K2 and/or Cgov increase, the expropriation likelihood decreases, but the inefficiency, when
expropriation does occur, increases.
3.2.3 Royalties vs. corporate income taxes
We now investigate how the choice between royalty tax and corporate income tax affects
the value of the expropriation option. So far we have assumed that the government relies
exclusively on corporate income taxes. We now compare this with the opposite case where the
government relies exclusively on royalties. We do this for the same combinations of S(t) and
x(t) as in Figure 3. In the baseline case we had τinc = 0.60 and τroy = 0. Here, we first set
τinc = 0 and compute the τroy which, in the absence of expropriation risk, gives the same value
of the oil field to the government. Next, we compute the value of the expropriation option
with this τroy.
Panel A of Figure 7 shows τroy while Panel B shows Proy(t0)−Pinc(t0), where Proy(t0) and
Pinc(t0) denote the values of the expropriation option when the government relies exclusively
on royalties and corporate income taxes, respectively. The value of the expropriation option is
always larger with royalties than with corporate income taxes. The reason is that the royalty
tax rate is always lower than the corporate income tax rate of 60 percent which implies that for
high oil prices the revenues from royalties are lower than from corporate income taxes making
expropriation more profitable. The differences in the value of the expropriation option are
largest for combinations of state variables where there is some probability of expropriation.
The differences are low when S(t) and x(t) are both low or when S(t) and x(t) are both
high. In the former case, the government never expropriates, while in the latter case, the
government almost surely expropriates regardless of whether it relies on royalties or corporate
income taxes.
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3.2.4 The “optimal” tax rate for the firm
In the absence of expropriation risk, it is optimal for the firm to negotiate the most favorable
terms under which to exploit the oil field. In our case, this means obtaining the lowest possible
tax rate. However, in the presence of expropriation risk, the firm must take into account that
the incentive to expropriate is higher for lower tax rates. For simplicity, we return to the case
where the government relies exclusively on corporate income taxes. Figure 8 shows the oil
field’s value to the firm as a function of τinc and K2. For low values of K2 the “optimal” tax
rate that maximizes the project’s value to the firm is quite high around 70 percent. As K2
increases, the “optimal” tax rate decreases, since the incentive to expropriate decreases.
3.2.5 Who bears the “deadweight loss”
Suppose t0 is the time when the government auctions off the lease for the oil field. Furthermore,
assume that extraction requires an initial investment of I. In the absence of expropriation
risk, a firm would be willing to pay up to Vfirm(t0)− I for the lease, while in the presence of
expropriation risk, it would only be willing to pay up to V expfirm(t0) − I.
14 If the government
could commit itself, ex-ante, not to expropriate, it would be able to extract a value of up to
Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0) − I from the oil field. However, in the absence of a legal framework to
enforce contracts, such a commitment is not credible, since, ex-post, after the firm has paid for
the lease and made the initial investment, it will be optimal for the government to renege on
its promise in some states of the world. A rational firm will anticipate this behavior and the
maximum value that the government can extract from the field will be V expgov (t0)+V
exp
firm(t0)−I.
Ultimately, therefore, it is the government that bears the “deadweight loss” associated with
the possibility of expropriation.
3.3 Implementation
When implementing the model for actual valuation, the analyst must choose a set of reasonable
parameters. The parameters and state variables of the Trolle and Schwartz (2007) model can
be obtained by calibrating the model to, say, NYMEX futures and options prices.15 Tax rates
14For simplicity, we abstract from the option to defer the initial investment.
15The price of crude-oil from a particular oil field will usually differ from the price at NYMEX (which refers to
the benchmark West Texas Intermediate blend) due to differences in quality. However, the correlation with the
NYMEX price is likely to be very high which implies that one can calibrate the model to NYMEX derivatives
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are given and reserve size and production can be estimated. The main problem is estimating
the government’s expropriation costs. While it may be possible to infer production costs for
a state-run oil company, it is harder to estimate the compensation to the firm in case of
expropriation and even more difficult to estimate the “reputational” costs. Figure 5 and 6
show that the results are sensitive to these costs and any conclusions drawn from the model
should reflect this uncertainty.
4 Conclusion
In this paper we develop a model for pricing expropriation risk in natural resource projects in
general and an oil field in particular. The government is viewed as holding an American-style
option to expropriate the oil field. Expropriation is not costless, however, and we consider
three possible expropriation costs for the government: A state-run company may produce oil
less cost-efficiently than a private firm, the government may have to pay a compensation to the
firm and, perhaps most importantly, there may be “reputational” costs as investors will lose
confidence in the government’s willingness to honor contracts. The dynamics of key variables
– the spot price, futures prices and volatility – is described by a model proposed and estimated
in Trolle and Schwartz (2007) and the expropriation option is valued by simulations using the
LSM approach developed by Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).
We find that the value of the expropriation option increases with the spot price, the slope of
the futures curve and futures (and spot) price volatility, while it decreases with the corporate
income tax rate and the various expropriation costs. For reasonable parameter values and
under market conditions not too different from what has been seen in recent years, the value
of the expropriation option can be substantial. The value of the expropriation option increases
if the government switches from corporate income taxes to royalty taxes in such a way that the
value of the oil field to the government in the absence of expropriation risk is unchanged. In
order to reduce the incentive for the government to expropriate, from the firm’s point of view
there is an “optimal” tax rate on corporate profits which may be quite high. Furthermore,
when firms act rationally, the possibility of expropriation leads to a decrease in the total value
that the government can initially extract from the oil field.
To keep the analysis focused, we have assumed an exogenous production process.16 An
and subsequently adjust the spot price to reflect the actual crude-oil quality.
16In our example, production is constant. However, it is straightforward to make production time and state
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interesting extension of the model would be to make production endogenous and take into ac-
count the various operational options that are typically imbedded in natural resource projects.
This should be feasible, given the flexibility of the LSM approach.
Furthermore, although we have discussed royalties vs. corporate income taxes, the tax
structure remains very simple. It would be interesting to study the optimal resource extraction
contract within our setup, perhaps drawing on some of the results in Engel and Fishers’ paper
in this volume.
dependent.
13
Appendices
Appendix A: The Trolle and Schwartz (2007) model
Here, we briefly review the model of Trolle and Schwartz (2007).17 The model is based on the
Heath, Jarrow, and Morton (1992) framework for interest rate dynamics and takes the initial
futures curve or, equivalently, the initial cost of carry curve as given. S(t) denotes the time-t
spot price of the commodity, δ(t) denotes the time-t instantaneous spot cost of carry, y(t, T )
denote the time-t instantaneous forward cost of carry at time T and v(t) denotes the volatility
state variable. The general specification of the model is given by
dS(t)
S(t)
= δ(t)dt + σS
√
v(t)dWQ1 (t) (10)
dy(t, T ) = µy(t, T )dt + σy(t, T )
√
v(t)dWQ2 (t) (11)
dv(t) = κv(θ − v(t))dt + σv
√
v(t)dWQ3 (t), (12)
where WQ1 (t), W
Q
2 (t) and W
Q
3 (t) denote correlated Wiener processes under the risk-neutral
measure with pairwise correlations given by ρ12, ρ13 and ρ123, and the drift term in (11) is
given by
µy(t, T ) = −v(t)σy(t, T )
(
ρ12σS +
∫ T
t
σy(t, u)du
)
(13)
to ensure that the model is arbitrage-free.
We obtain a highly tractable model by specifying σy(t, T ) as
σy(t, T ) = αe
−γ(T−t). (14)
In this case futures prices are exponentially affine in three state variables s(t) ≡ log(S(t)), x(t)
and φ(t) which, along with v(t) jointly constitute an affine state vector. In general, the model
is time-inhomogeneous but we obtain a time-homogeneous model by assuming that the initial
forward cost of carry curve, y(0, t), is flat and equal to a constant, ϕ. Let F (t, T ) denote the
time-t price of a futures contract maturing at time T . Then we have
F (t, T ) = exp
{
ϕ(T − t) + s(t) +
α
γ
(
1− e−γ(T−t)
)
x(t) +
α
2γ
(
1− e−2γ(T−t)
)
φ(t)
}
, (15)
17In fact, in that paper we propose two models, one model with one volatility factor and another model with
two volatility factors. We show that the latter model outperforms the former, particularly in terms of pricing
short-term derivatives. However, for pricing real options with long maturities, the performance of the models
are likely to be similar. In the interest of parsimony, we therefore work with the model with one volatility
factor.
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where s(t), x(t) and φ(t) evolve according to
ds(t) =
(
ϕ+ αx(t) + αφ(t)−
1
2
σ2Sv(t)
)
dt + σS
√
v(t)dWQ1 (t) (16)
dx(t) =
(
−γx(t)−
(
α
γ
+ ρ12σS
)
v(t)
)
dt+
√
v(t)dWQ2 (t) (17)
dφ(t) =
(
α
γ
v(t)− 2γφ(t)
)
dt. (18)
Appendix B: Pricing the expropriation option by the LSM algorithm
Here we briefly explain how to price the expropriation option using the LSM algorithm of
Longstaff and Schwartz (2001).
1. Simulate M paths of Xt. Let Xm(ti), P̂m(ti) and Πm(ti) denote the value of the state
vector, the estimated option value and the option payoff, respectively, at time ti along
the m’th path. Furthermore, let Ii denote the subset of paths for which the option is
in-the-money at time ti
2. At time tN−1 the value of the option is equal to its immediate exercise value. Therefore,
P̂m(tN−1) = Πm(tN−1), m = 1, ...,M .
3. Apply backwards induction from i = N − 2 to i = 1.
• At time ti the value of the option is equal to the maximum of its immediate exercise
value and its expected continuation value. Longstaff and Schwartz (2001) suggest
approximating the expected continuation value by the fitted value of a cross-sectional
least squares regression where the ex-post realized cash-flows from continuation are
regressed on a set of basis functions of the state variables. In other words, we run the
regression
e−r(ti+1−ti)P̂m(ti+1) =
J∑
j=1
βjψj(Xm(ti)) + ǫm,m ∈ Ii (19)
where ψj denotes the j’th basis function.
18 Note that we only use the paths for which
the option is in-the-money at time ti since it is only on these paths that the government
18We use the following set of functions: 1, sm(ti), sm(ti)
2, xm(ti), xm(ti)
2, vm(ti), vm(ti)
2, sm(ti)xm(ti),
sm(ti)vm(ti) and xm(ti)vm(ti). Adding higher-order terms does not change the results.
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may choose to exercise. The fitted value of this regression
Ĉm(ti) =
J∑
j=1
β̂jψj(Xm(ti)),m ∈ Ii (20)
is an efficient unbiased estimate of the expected continuation value.
• Update the estimated option value along each path as:
P̂m(ti) =
{ Πm(ti), Πm(ti) ≥ Ĉm(ti)
e−r(ti+1−ti)P̂m(ti+1), Πm(ti) < Ĉm(ti),
(21)
for m ∈ Ii and
P̂m(ti) = e
−r(ti+1−ti)P̂m(ti+1) (22)
for m 6∈ Ii.
4. Compute the estimated option value as
P̂ (t0) = e
−r(t1−t0) 1
M
M∑
m=1
P̂m(t1). (23)
In general, we obtain a lower bound on the option value, since we approximate the continuation
value. Cle´ment, Lamberton, and Protter (2002) prove that the LSM algorithm converges to
the true option price as M →∞.
As part of the LSM algorithm we also obtain the early exercise strategy. Let tZm denote the
estimated time of expropriation along path m. We start by setting Zm = N for m = 1, ...,M .
corresponding to no expropriation along any of the paths. Then we move backwards from
i = N − 1 to i = 1. If at time ti along path m it is optimal to exercise the option we set
Zm = i.
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estimate standard error
κv 1.0125 0.0123
σv 2.8226 0.0212
α 0.1365 0.0024
γ 0.7796 0.0011
σS 0.2275 0.0017
ρ12 -0.8797 0.0040
ρ13 -0.0912 0.0018
ρ23 -0.1128 0.0116
ϕ 0.0054 0.0001
Notes: The table shows maximum-likelihood estimates of the model in Appendix A based on daily data. For
details we refer to Trolle and Schwartz (2007). This table is an excerpt from their Table 5.
Table 1: Parameter estimates
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Oct. 11, 1990 Dec. 21, 1998 Apr. 21, 2006
S(t0) 41.26 10.62 78.03
x(t0) -4.67 2.49 -0.78
φ(t0) 0.29 0.33 0.33
v(t0) 13.72 7.11 2.17
P (t0), million USD 0.55 0.05 159.18
Vgov(t0), million USD 557.45 296.74 2966.30
V expgov (t0), million USD 558.00 296.78 3125.49
V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0)− 1, % 0.10 0.02 5.37
Vfirm(t0), million USD 371.63 197.82 1977.53
V expfirm(t0), million USD 370.66 197.64 993.06
V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1, % -0.26 -0.09 -49.78
“Deadweight loss”, million USD 0.42 0.14 825.29
Notes: The table shows, on three specific dates, the values of the state variables, the value of the ex-
propriation option (P (t0)), the oil field’s value to the government without and with expropriation pos-
sibility and the percentage change in value (Vgov(t0), V
exp
gov (t0) and V
exp
gov (t0)/Vgov(t0) − 1, respectively),
the oil field’s value to the firm without and with expropriation possibility and the percentage change
in value (Vfirm(t0), V
exp
firm(t0) and V
exp
firm(t0)/Vfirm(t0) − 1, respectively), and the “deadweight loss”, i.e.
(Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0))−

V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)

.
Table 2: Expropriation risk on three specific dates
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Panel A: S(t) Panel B: x(t)
Panel C: φ(t) Panel D: v(t)
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Figure 1: Time series of state variables
The figure shows time series of the state variables as estimated by Trolle and Schwartz (2007). This figure is an
excerpt from their Figure 5. The vertical dotted lines mark the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990, the
beginning of the US-led liberation of Kuwait (“Operation Desert Storm”) on January 17, 1991, the September
11, 2001 terrorist attacks and the US-led invasion of Iraq on March 20, 2003, respectively. The vertical grey
lines mark the three dates that we investigate further in Table 2: October 11, 1990, December 21, 1998 and
April 21, 2006. Each time series consists of 4082 daily observations from January 2, 1990 to May 18, 2006.
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Figure 2: Futures curves
The figure shows the futures curves for different combinations of S(t) and x(t). ’——’ corresponds to S(t) = 20
and x(t) = −3, ’– – –’ corresponds to S(t) = 20 and x(t) = 3, ’– · –’ corresponds to S(t) = 80 and x(t) = −3,
and ’· · · · · · ’ corresponds to S(t) = 80 and x(t) = 3.
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Figure 3: Expropriation risk as a function of S(t) and x(t)
Panel A shows the value of the expropriation option, i.e. P (t0). Panel B shows the “deadweight loss”, i.e.
(Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0))−

V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)

. Panel C shows the percentage increase in the oil field’s value
to the government when taking into account the expropriation possibility, i.e. V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0)− 1. Panel D
shows the percentage decrease in the oil field’s value to the firm when taking into account the expropriation
possibility, i.e. −

V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1

.
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Panel A: Option value
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Figure 4: Expropriation risk as a function of S(t) and v(t)
Panel A shows the value of the expropriation option, i.e. P (t0). Panel B shows the “deadweight loss”, i.e.
(Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0))−

V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)

. Panel C shows the percentage increase in the oil field’s value
to the government when taking into account the expropriation possibility, i.e. V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0)− 1. Panel D
shows the percentage decrease in the oil field’s value to the firm when taking into account the expropriation
possibility, i.e. −

V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1

.
22
Panel A: Option value
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Figure 5: Expropriation risk as a function of tax rate and “reputational” costs
Panel A shows the value of the expropriation option, i.e. P (t0). Panel B shows the “deadweight loss”, i.e.
(Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0))−

V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)

. Panel C shows the percentage increase in the oil field’s value
to the government when taking into account the expropriation possibility, i.e. V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0)− 1. Panel D
shows the percentage decrease in the oil field’s value to the firm when taking into account the expropriation
possibility, i.e. −

V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1

.
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Figure 6: Expropriation risk as a function of “reputational” costs and state-run company’s
production cost
Panel A shows the value of the expropriation option, i.e. P (t0). Panel B shows the “deadweight loss”, i.e.
(Vgov(t0) + Vfirm(t0))−

V expgov (t0) + V
exp
firm(t0)

. Panel C shows the percentage increase in the oil field’s value
to the government when taking into account the expropriation possibility, i.e. V expgov (t0)/Vgov(t0)− 1. Panel D
shows the percentage decrease in the oil field’s value to the firm when taking into account the expropriation
possibility, i.e. −

V expfirm(t0)/Vfirm(t0)− 1

.
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Panel A: Royalty tax equivalent
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Figure 7: Change in option value when shifting from corporate income taxes to royalties
Panel A shows the τroy which, in the absence of expropriation risk, gives the same value of the oil field to the
government as τinc = 0.60. Panel B shows Proy(t0) − Pinc(t0), where Proy(t0) and Pinc(t0) denote the values
of the expropriation option when the government relies exclusively on royalties and corporate income taxes,
respectively.
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Figure 8: Oil field’s value to the firm in the presence of expropriation risk as a function of tax
rate and “reputational” costs
The figure shows the dollar value of the oil field to the firm in the presence of expropriation risk, i.e. V expfirm(t0).
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